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Articulating Consciousness 




Abstract The present paper aims at reconstructing a conception of descriptive 
analysis that Brentano and the early Husserl share. According to this shared 
conception, the descriptive analysis consists in the articulation of the multi-
layered part-whole structure of consciousness. Focusing on the problem of 
intentional reference, we show how they, to carry out descriptive analyses thus 
defined, make different distinctions among parts of consciousness. We further 
show how such a difference is closely connected to the two philosophers’ views 
on the nature of intentional reference. 
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1. Introduction 
It is tempting to characterize phenomenology methodologically. As Reinach 
claims in his lecture “Concerning Phenomenology” in 1914:  
 
Phenomenology is not a matter of a system of philosophical propositions 
and truths [...] but rather it is a method of philosophizing which is required 
by the problems of philosophy, a method which is very different from the 
manner of viewing and verifying in life, and which is even more different 
from the way in which one does and must work in most of the sciences. 
(Reinach 2012, 144, our emphases)  
 
Being a method, phenomenology thus conceived is a way along which we try to 
discover something. Truths, which we might find out with the method, would not 
be the meat of phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty seems to hold a similar idea when 
he writes in the preface to Phenomenology of Perception: “If phenomenology 
was a movement prior to having been a doctrine or a system, this is neither 
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accidental nor a deception” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxv). 
However, when it comes to the nature of the method of phenomenology, 
people have hardly agreed to each other. A good example of this can be found in 
the phenomenologists mentioned above. Reinach, toward the end of his lecture, 
equates “things themselves,” to which phenomenology is supposed to return, 
with “pure and unobscured intuition of essences” (cf. Reinach 2012, 164). This 
view would probably be rejected by Merleau-Ponty for whom, to quote the 
preface to his 1945 book again, “[t]he necessity of passing through essences 
does not signify that philosophy takes them as an object” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 
lxxviii). 
Even in such a situation, many would agree with the weaker, flexible, and 
tentative claim that a method of phenomenology is descriptive analysis. This claim 
is weaker because it is not about the method of phenomenology; it admits that 
there are some other methods of phenomenology. It is flexible for two reasons. 
First, it makes wide open what is descriptively analyzed by phenomenology; 
descriptive analysis may be about essences, one’s embodied existence in the 
world, or something else. Second, it makes wide open too what phenomenology 
aims at doing with the method in question; descriptive analysis may be an end in 
itself or a mean to some other end(s) such as philosophy of mind, epistemology, 
metaphysics, ethics, or whatever else. It is tentative because it does not specify 
what the descriptive analysis amounts to. There is a sense in which descriptive 
analysis is a method (perhaps among others) for, for instance, qualitative research 
in general. What is, if any, distinctive about phenomenology as a method for 
descriptive analysis? On this question, the above claim remains silent.  
Against such a background, the present paper proposes a slightly more 
substantial characterization of the descriptive analysis as a method of 
phenomenology. Focusing on Brentano and (the early) Husserl, we reconstruct 
the descriptive analysis as they practice as the articulation of the multi-layered 
part-whole structure of consciousness.1 Arguably, this makes phenomenology 
                                              
1 We do not mean to say that this idea exhausts Husserl's conception of descriptive analysis. As 
we will see in Section 4, Husserl, in Ideas I (1913), attempts to expand the domain of descriptive 
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different from most, if not all, of qualitative research. More importantly, the 
proposed idea is more substantial than the above one because it is less flexible 
in certain respect. It limits the target of descriptive analysis to the part-whole 
structure consciousness, from which anything that transcends consciousness is 
excluded. Apart from this point, however, the proposed idea will not go far away 
from the initial claim. It remains weak because it is not about the method of 
phenomenology. It does not lose the flexibility totally in so far as it leaves open 
what the aim of phenomenology is. 
Now, even though we attempt to show that Brentano and Husserl share 
the method of descriptive analysis, we do not mean to say that they share the 
results of their analyses down to all the details. Rather, at least according to a 
certain interpretation, they hold quite contrary views on the intentional reference 
(intentionale Beziehung) of acts of consciousness. This opposition could be 
understood better if we ascribe to them the general idea of descriptive analysis 
just mentioned. For their opposed views stem partially from their different takes 
on parts, or so we shall argue. 
The present paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we give some 
textual evidence for the parallel between Brentano and Husserl on the method of 
descriptive analysis. In Section 3–4, we reconstruct how Brentano and Husserl 
articulate consciousness, focusing not only on their analyses but also on the 
backgrounds of those analyses: Theories of parts and wholes. This enables us to 
understand better the complicated relationship—agreements and 
disagreements—between the two philosophers. In Section 4, we make a brief 
remark on how to understand the results of our discussion. 
Before going into the body of the paper, we need to give a short note on 
the citation. In what follows, unless otherwise noted, we refer to the first edition 
of Husserl’s Logical Investigations in 1900/01. Consequently, we sometimes 
modify Findley’s English translation, which is based on the second edition. 
Moreover, we sometimes do not cite the English translation when we refer to a 
passage of Logical Investigations that is deleted or thoroughly modified in the 
second edition. 
 
1. Preliminaries: (The Early) Husserl’s Debts on Brentano 
                                              
analysis to transcendent objects of consciousness. In the present paper, we mainly deal with 
Husserl's earlier position in Logical Investigations (1900/01). Therefore, most appearances of 
“Husserl” in what follows could be taken as designating the early Husserl. 
 4 
It is not difficult to hear the voice of Brentano echoing in the early Husserl. For 
instance, in the introduction to the second volume of Logical Investigations, he 
unambiguously claims that “phenomenology is descriptive psychology” (Hua 
XIX/1, 24). What he has in mind here is a discipline that Brentano has baptized as 
late as in the later 1880s, in which the two philosophers already had a close 
relationship.2 In his lectures on descriptive psychology in this period, Brentano 
presumably even uses the term phenomenology to name his discipline.3 It is 
true that Husserl officially withdraws the identification of phenomenology with 
descriptive psychology in 1903 (cf. Hua XXII, 207). This does not entitle us, 
however, to underestimate how much he owes to his teacher in philosophy. As we 
will see, as far as Logical Investigations is concerned, he takes over not only the 
name but also some substantial ideas from Brentano’s project of descriptive 
psychology. 
Husserl’s early conception of descriptive analysis, which is one of his debts 
on Brentano, is most explicitly stated in §16 of the Fifth Investigation: 
 
By the real (reell) or phenomenological content of an act, we mean the 
sum total of its concrete or abstract parts, in other words, the sum total 
of the partial experiences that really (reell) constitute it. To single out and 
describe such parts is the task of pure descriptive psychological analysis. 
Such analysis is in all cases concerned to dismember inwardly perceived 
experience as it in self is, in so far as they are really given in perception, 
without reference to genetic contexts and even without reference to what 
those experiences mean apart from themselves and what they are 
veridical for.  (Hua XIX/1, 411–412 [tr. vol. 2, 112], our emphases, 
translation modified) 
 
Without going too much into details, we can read off three interrelated ideas from 
this passage. First, descriptive psychology or phenomenology attempts to analyze 
experiences or consciousness by dismembering (zergliedern) parts that make up 
the “ real [reell] ”  components them (i.e., components that become and 
                                              
2 For a relationship between Husserl and Brentano, see Rollinger (1999, 15–21), and Moran (2017). 
3 A script for Brentano’s lectures from 1888 to 1889 bears the title “Descriptive Psychology or 
Descriptive Phenomenology” (DP, 129 [tr. 137]). 
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disappear in the flux of consciousness). 4  Second, an attempt to single out 
(aufzeichnen) those parts is descriptive in so far as it is faithful to what is given in 
inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung), leaving intact anything that is not a part 
of consciousness. Third, descriptive psychology consequently does not concern 
with genetic contexts, namely contexts in which experiences come into existence 
following empirical laws. 
This line of ideas has its source in Brentano’s lectures on descriptive 
psychology. If we set aside details once again, the following passage confirms our 
interpretation. 
 
Psychology is the science of people’s inner life [Seelenleben], that is, the 
part of life which is captured in inner perception [innere Wahrnehmung]. 
It aims at exhaustively determining (if possible) the elements of human 
consciousness and the ways in which they are connected, and at 
describing the causal conditions which the particular phenomena are 
subjected to./The first is the subject matter of psychognosy, the second 
that of genetic psychology. (DP, 1 [tr. 1], our emphases; see also DP, 155 
[tr. 165]) 
 
Here, Brentano talks about two different branches of psychology: Descriptive 
psychology (which he calls psychognosy) and genetic psychology. The latter aims 
to explain how acts of consciousness, which he calls (mental) phenomena, come 
into existence; the former, which matters for our concern, attempts to identify 
elements of consciousness and how they do and can hang together. In this way, 
Brentano holds that descriptive-psychological analysis attempts to distinguish 
parts of consciousness as they are given in inner perception. In doing so, Brentano 
maintains, descriptive psychology does not concern generic contexts, which are 
a subject matter for genetic psychology.5 
                                              
4  Here, one could argue that the early Husserl adopts what Beaney (2007) calls the 
decompositional conception of analysis. Such an interpretation, however, would capture only a 
limited aspect of Husserl's view on analysis. As Beaney (2007, 207–210) points out, Husserl 
maintains that analysis may not be decompositional. In addition, we should note that at stake 
here is the descriptive analysis of consciousness rather than concepts. It would be beyond the 
scope of the present paper to reconstruct more comprehensibly what is analysis for Husserl. I'm 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
5 Further on Brentano’s distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology, see Antonelli 
(2001, 323–330) and Mulligan (2004, 66–68). Note, however, that there is a discrepancy between 
them. According to Mulligan, “Descriptive and explanatory [i.e., genetic] questions are clearly 
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 Before discussing details of Brentano’s and Husserl’s descriptive analyses 
of consciousness, we need a short remark on inner perception. When Brentano 
talks about the role of inner perception in descriptive psychology, he presupposes 
his well-known claim that every mental act is conscious (and thus worth the name 
“mental phenomenon”) because it is conscious of itself (cf. PES, 218 [tr. 153]).6 It 
is such self-relatedness of mental acts that he calls inner perception. It is not sure, 
however, whether and to what extent Husserl accepts this idea. He indeed uses 
the term inner perception to express his own idea in some passages in Logical 
Investigations (like the above one). This is, however, not always the case. In §5 of 
the Fifth Investigation, for instance, he claims that we can probably dispense with 
his teacher’s account of inner perception, which he even calls artificial (cf. Hua 
XIX/1, 367, deleted in the second edition). According to Zahavi (2005, 39–42), this 
indicates that Husserl rejects Brentano’s idea of inner perception already in the 
Logical Investigations. To examine such an interpretation, however, is out of the 
scope of the present paper. Fortunately, we can leave this issue open. Instead of 
taking about inner perception, we can replace it with inner consciousness. For 
Brentano, the two terms mean the same thing. Husserl possibly denies that. 
Independently of this potential opposition, the two philosophers would largely 
agree that descriptive analysis ought to be true to what we experience in our 
consciousness. That suffices for our discussion to follow.7 
 
3. Articulating Consciousness with Brentano 
To make better sense of Brentano’s descriptive analysis, we begin with his view on 
the unity of consciousness in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Arguably, 
our conscious life is not simple. Every moment so many mental phenomena such 
as seeing, hearing, thinking, and so on, are going on at once. “But,” as Brentano 
                                              
distinguished by Brentano in 1874, the labels ‘descriptive psychology’ and ‘genetic psychology’ 
followed later” (Mulligan [2004, 67]). Antonelli would disagree with this claim, emphasizing the 
difference between Psychology and the lectures on descriptive psychology (see Antonelli [2001, 
329–330]). 
6 For an attempt to reconstruct Brentano’s argument for this and related claims, see Textor (2017, 
chap. 4–7). 
7 For essentially the same reason, we do not deal with Husserl’s critical discussion of Brentano’s 
account of inner perception in the Appendix to Logical Investigations (Hua XIX/2, 751–775 [tr. vol. 
2, 335–348]), which is, indeed, otherwise very important.  
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points out, “this lack of simplicity was not a lack of unity” (PES, 221 [tr. 155]). 
What is, then, the nature of the unity of consciousness? In his own words: 
 
The question remains whether with such a large number of mental 
phenomena there is still a real [real] unity which encompasses them all. 
Are these phenomena all parts of a really [reell] unitary whole, or are we 
confronted here with a multiplicity of things, so that the totality of mental 
states must be regarded as a collective reality, as a group of phenomena, 
each of which is a thing in its own right or belongs to a particular thing? 
(PES, 221–222 [tr. 155]).  
 
According to him, there are two theoretical options for accommodating the unity 
of consciousness. First, the unity of consciousness could be understood as that of 
a thing (ein Ding). On this idea, varieties of mental phenomena taking place at 
once would be parts of the thing that is consciousness. Second, the unity of 
consciousness could be understood as a collection of things. If this is correct, the 
mental phenomena would be things that collectively make up consciousness. 
Of those two options, Brentano subscribes to the first one: Consciousness 
is unified as a thing, which has mental phenomena as its part. For this claim, he 
gives several arguments in Psychology. It would be beyond the scope of the 
present paper, however, to scrutinize each of them.8 For our aim, it suffices to 
look at one that could be reformulated as the following reductio argument 
against the second option (cf. PES, 225–226 [tr. 158–159]). Suppose that 
consciousness is unified as a collective of things. Then, it would be possible for 
any mental phenomenon to take place independently of any other mental 
phenomenon. For example, loving a scent of coffee could take place 
independently of presenting (Vorstellen) the scent. However, this is absurd. I 
cannot love something without presenting it. 9  Therefore, the above 
presupposition, namely, the first option is false. Now we are left with the second 
option. 
Even if Brentano succeeds in establishing his view on the unity of 
                                              
8 Further on Brentano’s discussion of the unity of consciousness, see Textor (2017, chap. 12).  
9 As Brentano argues in Psychology, every act is either presenting (Vorstellen), which presents an 
object to the subject, or based on presenting (cf. PES, 120 [tr. 85). Further on this claim, see Kriegel 
(2018, chap. 3). 
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consciousness, there still remains a problem. How do mental phenomena make 
up consciousness as a whole? How are they, as parts of consciousness, related to 
each other. Obviously, we do not always find the same relationship among these 
parts of the whole. In my conscious life, while, for instance, loving a scent of coffee 
is inseparable from presenting it, seeing the color of the sky is separable from 
both of them. For we can see the blue without loving the scent of coffee (and vice 
versa). Unless Brentano accommodates such varieties of the relationship among 
parts in consciousness as a whole, his account would remain incomplete. 
Brentano deals with this problem most extensively in his lectures on 
descriptive psychology. 10  Let us briefly reconstruct how he conceives the 
problem in these lectures. With reference to Psychology, he argues once again 
that consciousness is unified as a thing (DP, 10–12 [tr. 14–15]). Remarkably, in the 
course of the argument, he refuses the Humean conception of consciousness as 
a bundle of ideas (and of impressions). As Brentano observes, the term “bundle” 
is inappropriate to express the view that consciousness is unified as a thing. He 
raises two reasons for this claim. First, consciousness as a bundle, if we take it 
literally, would need something else that binds it together. This is not the case for 
the unity of consciousness as Brentano conceives. Second and more importantly, 
even if we take the term “ bundle ”  more loosely, it would imply that 
consciousness is made of a multitude of things located side-by-side. Neither does 
this hold for Brentano. Despite such a circumstance, Hume is undoubtedly correct 
in that “[o]ur consciousness does not present itself to our inner perception as 
something simple, but it shows itself as being composed of many parts” (DP, 12 
[tr. 15]). In this way, he arrives at the question that we have raised for his discussion 
in Psychology: How do parts of consciousness relate to each other? 
Now, Brentano begins his discussion of parts of consciousness by 
pointing out that many of them can be separated from others (cf. DP, 12 [tr. 15]). 
To take one of his examples, seeing and hearing can be mutually separated. For, I 
                                              
10 In the present paper, we deal with only limited aspects of Brentano’s discussions of parts and 
wholes. For more comprehensive studies on this topic, see Antonelli (2001, chaps. 11–12; 2012, 
129–132), Chrudzimski (2004, 152–159), Kriegel (2018, 32–40), Mulligan & Smith (1982; 1985, 632–
639), Salice (2017), Smith (1994, 51–82). 
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can stop seeing something while keeping on hearing something else and vice 
versa. Importantly, there are parts of consciousness that can be separated from 
other parts only one-sidedly. To take another example of Brentano, seeing is 
separable from noticing but not vice versa. I can see something without noticing 
it, whereas I need to see something in order to notice it (visually). 
With the notions of mutual and one-sided separability, Brentano then 
defines elements of consciousness (cf. DP, 13, 79 [tr. 16, 83]). An element of 
consciousness is a separable part of consciousness from which no further part 
could be separated, be it in a mutual or one-sided way. Unfortunately, he does 
not leave any example of such parts on his scripts for the lectures. Based on the 
above definition, however, we can presume that presenting the number one 
would be regarded as an element of consciousness in that sense. If it is not, it 
would be possible to separate some further part(s) from my presenting one either 
mutually or one-sidedly. Such a separation seems impossible. 
It must be noted that we should not understand elements of 
consciousness, with which Brentano’s descriptive psychology is supposed to 
operate, are confined to the smallest separable parts. According to him, “even 
these ultimate actually separable parts, in some sense, can be said to have further 
parts” (DP, 13 [tr. 16]). Even if a mental phenomenon has no further actually 
separable parts, we can distinguish its parts, just like we could distinguish halves 
of an indivisible atom (if any) (cf. DP, 13 [tr. 16]). Brentano calls such parts 
distinctional [distinktionell]. They are, he holds, also elements of consciousness as 
the objects of his descriptive psychology (cf. DP, 80 [tr. 84]; see also 27 [tr. 29]). 
That is probably why he talks about separable and distinctional elements of 
consciousness elsewhere in his lectures (DP, 29 [tr. 32]). 
According to Brentano, just as separable parts are classified into the two 
categories, distinctional parts of consciousness fall under (at least) the following 
four subclasses (cf. DP, 25, 79–80 [tr. 27, 84]): 
 
Mutually pervading parts; 
Logical parts; 
Parts of intentional correlate-pair;  
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Parts of the intentional directedness.11 
 
Of those subclasses, we shall focus on the first and third ones, which particularly 
matter when it comes to a comparison between Brentano and Husserl. 
Before looking more closely at Brentano’s taxonomy of distinctional parts, 
let us make two points to facilitate our discussion.  
First, we could talk about a distinctional part only with (potential) 
reference to a whole of which it is a part. As we can see from the above-quoted 
passage of Brentano (cf. DP, 13 [tr. 16]), the distinction of parts is always to be 
made within a certain part of consciousness. 
Second, in many cases, a talk about a distinctional part needs (potential) 
reference not only to the relevant whole but also to some fellow part(s) of that 
whole. We will soon deal with such cases in discussing the first and second 
subclasses of distinctional parts. Here, we shall focus on an exceptional case, 
namely Brentano’s discussion of logical parts of consciousness (cf. DP, 20–21 [tr. 
23]). According to him, if a particular is an instance of a certain genus, the latter 
is a logical part of the former. In other words, any determinate has its 
determinables as its logical parts. Thus, for example, seeing-red has seeing as one 
of its logical parts because the latter, despite its actual inseparability, can be 
distinguished from the former. As we can see from this case, Brentano admits that 
we can talk about a logical part (seeing) with reference only to the relevant whole 
(seeing-red). Since the relation between a (proper) part and a whole of which it is 
a part cannot be symmetric, any logical part is one-sidedly distinguished from the 
relevant whole. In contrast, as we will see below, if we need a (potential) reference 
to some fellow part(s) in taking about a distinctional part, the distinctional 
separability at stake would always be mutual. 
Now, since Brentano does not give any general characterization of 
mutually pervading parts, we have no choice but to look at examples he gives to 
illustrate what they are. The first group of his examples is taken from entities 
outside of consciousness. Assume that a (homogeneously) blue patch exists in a 
certain part of objective space.12 Within this patch, we could distinguish certain 
shade of blue, brightness, and spatial location. Obviously, they all would be 
distinctional parts of the patch. None of them could be really separated from the 
                                              
11 We follow Smith (1994, 55) in naming the third and fourth subclasses of distinctional parts. 
12 Brentano conceives this assumption as fictitious (fiktiv), because, according to him, outer 
senses are not reliable enough to believe that what we perceive is real (cf. DP 14 [tr. 17]). 
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others. What is, then, peculiar about the parts at stake here? To answer this 
question, let us compare them to logical parts. Just like the above case of seeing-
red and seeing, the blue patch has coloredness as a logical part of it. By 
distinguishing such a part, however, we would not obtain any further particular 
determination of the blue patch as a whole. What we would get is just some 
explication of how it is characterized more generally: It is not only blue (of this 
particular shade) but also colored. In contrast, when we distinguish certain shade 
of blue, brightness, and spatial location from the blue patch, we would articulate 
further some particular determinations of the patch. We would make explicit that 
it is not only of this particular shade of blue but also of this particular brightness 
and of this particular location. In this way, mutually pervading parts are to be 
understood as parts that make up particular, totally determinate characteristics of 
the relevant whole. 
Another important feature of mutually pervading part is that they totally 
coincide with each other in the relevant whole. Let us take the blue patch again 
as an example. Its mutually pervading parts are, according to Brentano, i) the 
particular shade of blue, ii) the particular brightness, and iii) the particular spatial 
location. Since there can be no particular shade of color without a particular 
brightness, i) and ii) coincide totally in the blue patch. Where there is one, there 
must be the other. Since iii) is exactly such a location of those two parts, the total 
coincidence holds among all those parts. Put metaphorically, the blue patch as a 
whole is filled with them. That is probably why they are called mutually pervading 
parts.13 
With these clarifications at hand, let us consider Brentano’s only example 
of mutually pervading parts of consciousness. According to him, the act of 
judging “there is a truth” consists of the following mutually pervading parts (cf. 
DP, 20 [tr. 22]): 
 
(a) affirmative quality 
(b) being directed [Gerichtetsein] upon the object ‘truth’ 
                                              
13 It is perhaps not a good idea, however, to stick too much to the expression “mutually pervading 
[sich durchwohnend].” Brentano thinks that distinctional parts at stake here lack a commonly 
accepted name for scientific use (cf. DP, 19 [tr. 22]). Therefore, the expression might not be accurate 
enough to capture the nature of those parts. 
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(c) self-evidence [Evidenz] 
(d) the apodictic modality 
 
Obviously, they all are distinctional parts of the act in question. None of them can 
be really separated from the others. It is also easy to see that they make up the 
particular characteristics of the act. There are no further determinates of which 
those parts are determinables. Let us see how they jointly characterize the 
relevant whole. (a), together with (b), determines the intentional reference of the 
act: By virtue of them, the act is directed to the truth in an affirmative way. What 
about (c) and (d)? The first thing to note here is that the self-evidence of the act 
consists in the fact that the truth of the judgment is transparent to the judger. 
Such transparency is further grounded in the fact that the truth at stake here is of 
apodictic modality, namely necessity of a certain sort. To see why this is the case, 
let us suppose that I stop affirming that there is a truth and deny the existence of 
the same subject matter, namely truth. Then, I would immediately lead to a 
contradiction in admitting that there is the truth that there is no truth. In this way, 
(c) and (d) also determines the intentional reference of the act in question: By 
virtue of those parts, the act of judging is directed to its object with apodictic self-
evidence. 
It is not that clear, however, whether (a) to (d) coincide with each other in 
the relevant whole: The act of judging “there is a truth.” A key to clarifying this 
point is found in Brentano’s discussion of the fourth subclass of distinctional parts, 
namely parts of the intentional directedness. As we have seen, he holds that an 
act is conscious by virtue of inner perception. On this idea, every mental 
phenomenon would possess two different intentional references. If I love the 
scent of coffee, for instance, this mental phenomenon is, on the one hand, 
intentionally directed to the loved scent. On the other hand, my loving is 
intentionally directed to itself. Brentano counts those intentional directions as 
distinctional parts of the mental phenomenon.14 Even though they cannot be 
really separated, we can distinguish them within any mental phenomenon. 
Obviously, they are not logical parts of mental phenomena. They both are totally 
determinate. Then, it might seem plausible to classify them as mutually pervading 
parts. However, Brentano rejects such an option. His reason for the rejection is the 
                                              
14 For a different take on this idea, see Kriegel (2018, 30–40). 
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following (cf. DP, 25 [tr. 27]). The above-mentioned mutually pervading parts, (a) 
to (d), belongs to the reference to one and the same object, namely truth. This is 
what we have confirmed above. The parts at stake now, in contrast, are directed 
to two different objects: The loved scent and my loving, to continue with the 
above example. Thus, he claims: “The present case is, in this respect, similar to 
those separable parts which we discerned earlier in the psychical domain, like, e.g., 
seeing and hearing […]” (DP, 25 [tr. 27]). We can differentiate seeing and hearing 
by differentiating their objects, namely colors and sounds. Likewise, according to 
Brentano, we can distinguish the two intentional references in a mental 
phenomenon by distinguishing their objects. In this way, these intentional 
references do not coincide with each other. This means that the mutually 
pervading parts (a) to (d), in so far as they cannot be differentiated in terms of 
their objects, coincide with each other.  
Having glanced at the three of the four subclasses of distinctional parts, 
we finally deal with the one that remains: Parts of intentional correlate-pair. Being 
a reference (Beziehung), intentional reference always involves two terms: What is 
referring and what is referred to. To quote some Brentano’s examples, seeing 
always make a pair with what is seen, presenting with what is presented, wanting 
with what is wanted, and so on (cf. DP, 21 [tr. 24]). 
One might object that parts of intentional correlate-pair are not a sort of 
distinctional parts. Seeing might be inseparable from what is seen. But does the 
converse relation hold? For there is a sense in which what is seen would remain 
even after seeing disappears. A mountain in front of my office, for instance, would 
remain there even after I stop seeing it. 
One way to respond to such a question is to resort to the interpretation 
that Brentano subscribes to the immanent theory of intentionality (before his so-
called reist period in which he rejects that theory). This interpretation rests on, 
among others, a certain reading of the often-quoted passage from Psychology. 
 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, 
and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, a reference 
to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood 
here as meaning something real [Reales]), or immanent objectivity. Every 
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mental phenomenon includes something as an object within itself, 
although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something 
is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, 
in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (PES, 124–125 [tr. 88], 
translation modified, our emphases) 
 
If we are to put emphasis on the italicized parts, this key passage suggests that 
an intentional act of, say, loving the scent of coffee has the loved scent within it. 
If so, anything outside of one’s mind could not be such an immanent object. This 
is, according to the interpretation in question, (part of) what he has in mind when 
he denies that objects in question are real. Then, it would be the case that 
Brentano keeps this series of ideas in his lectures on descriptive psychology: 
“these correlates display the peculiarity that the one alone is real, [whereas] the 
other is not something real [nichts Reales]” (DP, 21 [tr. 24]).  
 Relying on this interpretation, we can reconstruct Brentano’s conception 
of parts of intentional correlation-pair as follows.15 According to him, intentional 
reference holds between two parts of the relevant whole, namely the act which 
possesses that reference. To take the above example again, the act of loving the 
scent of coffee has two parts—loving and the loved scent—, which serve as terms 
of intentional reference. Those two parts are distinctional. Loving and the loved 
cannot be separated actually. They are certainly not logical parts. Being a pair, 
                                              
15 It should be noted that even though this interpretation has many proponents such as, to name 
a few, Smith (1994, 44) and Chrudzimski (2001), it is not the only available option. According to 
Antonelli (2001, 395–405, esp. 403–404; 2012), this interpretation is mistaken, and Brentano’s 
notion of intentional correlates in his lectures on descriptive psychology is not identical with that 
of intentional or immanent objects in Psychology. For interpretations on the same line with 
Antonelli’s, see also Sauer (2006), Fréchette (2013). Kriegel (2018, 54–67) would agree with them 
in that we could not attribute the immanent theory of intentionality to Brentano in any period in 
his philosophical development. For an objection to Antonelli, see Chrudzimski (2004, 155–
156n150). For a more extensive and yet opinionated overview of the debate on this issue, see 
Taieb (2018, 88–103), who defends the interpretation on a similar line with Smith, Chrudzimski, 
and others. 
In this paper, we adopt the interpretation favored by Smith and others primarily because it 
captures well at least how Husserl conceives his teacher’s theory of intentionality. Whether this 
interpretation holds for the real, historical Brentano is another problem, into which we do not go 
further here. At this moment, therefore, we must accept the following conditional claim: If the 
interpretation we adopt is historically incorrect, our discussion to follow would be on the 
relationship between Husserl and his Brentano rather than the real Brentano. 
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they involve reference to each other, which is, as we have seen, missing in the case 
of logical parts. It is at this point that Brentano subscribes to a contentious 
position. According to him, parts of intentional correlation-pair are sui generis. 
Even though this claim needs some justification, he leaves no reason for it in the 
script of his lectures. There are, however, two ideas that would jointly explain his 
position. First, as we have already seen, of parts of intentional correlation-pair, 
one is always not real. This means that intentional relation does not need all its 
relata to be existent. Second, intentional reference or relation (Relation), in which 
parts of intentional correlation-pair are found, is a “mental” relation that holds 
only in the domain of the mental (cf. DP, 22 [tr. 24]). In these respects, intentional 
relation is different from many other relations that would also hold in the world 
of physical bodies(if such a world exists). Brentano’s examples for those latter 
relations are “that of part and whole, agreement and difference, cause and effect, 
and so forth” (DP, 22 [tr. 24], our emphases). What does he mean by the relation 
of part and whole here? Since intentional relation is also a relation between parts 
in a whole, a natural reading would be following: Because intentional relation is a 
domain-specific, Brentano conceives it as different from part-whole relation of 
other, non-domain-specific sorts.  
 Let us summarize our discussion in this section. Brentano’s descriptive 
analysis of consciousness consists in the articulation of the multi-layered part-
whole structure of consciousness. According to him, consciousness is a whole (a 
thing) with various mental acts as parts, which are themselves wholes of parts. In 
getting grips with such complexity, he differentiates various kinds of parts. Of 
those kinds, distinctional parts are the most important from a methodological 
point of view. They are really inseparable from each other, Therefore, when 
Brentano analyzes a mental act into parts of this kind, what he does is not to be 
understood as an operation analogous to disassembling, say, a watch into parts 
(such as wheels, springs...). Rather, he brings to the light the act’s part-whole 
structure without making them smaller in the literal sense. That is why we 
characterize his descriptive analysis as the articulation of consciousness.  
To bridge this to the next section, we shall make a crucial point: Brentano’s 
taxonomy of parts in the present context is, better or worse, not systematic in a 
certain sense. It lacks a unified point of view, from which all those kinds of parts 
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are discussed trans-categorially. According to Brentano, an act of, say, loving the 
scent of coffee would have (determinable) loving as a logical part on the one hand 
and (determinate) loving as a part of intentional correlation-pair on the other. It 
would further have a being directed upon the scent as one of its mutually 
pervading parts, and yet it would also have something that bears the same 
name—being directed upon the scent—as a part of the intentional direction. Both 
of those parts are particular and thus totally determinate. Then, how many parts 
have we counted in the act of loving the scent of coffee? How do those three-or-
four parts, which do not belong to the same category, hang together in the act? 
It seems that Brentano neither responds to these questions nor leaves any clue 
for his response in his scripts for the lectures on descriptive psychology. Possibly, 
he might hold the pluralist view that the part-whole structure of consciousness is 
talked about from various perspectives, which need not (or even cannot) be 
unified. It would be beyond our aim to examine whether he is really a pluralist 
about parts and, if so, to what extent his position is plausible. Be that as it may, 
such a pluralism would be refused by a student of Brentano: Edmund Husserl. 
 
3. Articulating Consciousness with Husserl 
In this section, focusing on Logical Investigations, we will show how Husserl 
practices descriptive analysis of consciousness along with the idea that he inherits 
from Brentano. To such an attempt, however, one might raise a question. If we are 
to follow a certain interpretation, Brentano holds the immanent theory of 
intentionality, according to which what is seen, for instance, is a part of the 
relevant act of seeing. In contrast, Husserl famously criticized the immanent 
theory as a fundamental error (cf. Hua XIX/1, 436 [tr. vol. 2, 120]). How can they 
arrive at such different opinions about intentional reference, if they share the 
method of descriptive analysis? To answer this question, we start our discussion 
by looking briefly at Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes.16 
 Husserl’s theory of parts and whole, which he develops most 
systematically in the Third Logical Investigation, can be understood as his attempt 
to modify Brentano’s (and Stumpf’s) account of the same topic (cf. Mulligan & 
Smith 1982, 35). It is true that Husserl explicitly mentions Brentano only once in 
the Third Logical Investigation. If we look closer at the relevant passage with 
                                              
16  For further discussion on Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes as a method of his 
phenomenology, see Drummond (2008) and Sokolowski (1968). For attempts to reconstruct this 
theory in more ontology-oriented manners, see Correia (2004), Fine (1995), and Simons (1982). 
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reference to some others, however, we will see how he modifies his teacher’s idea. 
 
If we consider any pair of parts of a whole, the following possibilities 
obtain: 
1. There is a relation of foundation between both parts 
2. There is no such relation.  
In case 1, the foundation can be: 
(a) mutual 
(b) one-sided […].  
Color and extension accordingly are mutually founded in [the object of] 
a unified intuition, since no color is thinkable without a certain extension 
and no extension without a certain color. The character of being a 
judgment is, on the other hand, one-sidedly founded on underlying 
presentations, since these latter need not function as foundations of 
judgements. Brentano’s distinctions of parts with “mutual” and “one-
sided” separability agree in extension, though not in definition, with the 
present distinction. Brentano’s supplementary talk of “ mutual 
separability” rules out every sort of foundational relation. (Hua XIX/1, 
270–271 [tr. vol. 2, 27–28], translation modified, some new lines are added, 
our emphases) 
 
It should be already clear that Husserl’s descriptive analysis also consists in the 
articulation of consciousness. He agrees with Brentano in bringing inseparable 
parts into the discussion. The question is how to understand their agreement 
more in detail. The key to the answer is the foundation (Fundierung), which 
Husserl defines elsewhere in the Third Investigation as the relation of existential 
dependence among parts of a whole: For any x, y, and z such that x and y are 
parts of z, x is founded by y just in case x cannot exist without y in z.17 Such pars 
                                              
17  Husserl’s own definition runs as follow: “If A as such cannot exist except in a more 
comprehensive unity which connects it with an M, we say that an A as such requires foundation 
by an M […]" (Hua XIX/1, 265[tr. vol. 2, 25], translation modified, our emphases). In the present 
paper, we do not deal with how essences play a crucial role in Husserl’s discussion of foundation. 
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are called “dependent parts [unselbständige Teile]” or “moments [Momente]” (cf. 
Hua XIX/1, 272 [tr. vol. 2, 29]). With his notion of foundation, Husserl conceives 
himself to have given alternative definitions to some of his teacher’s notions of 
parts. Unfortunately, however, Husserl’s wording here is quite misleading. To see 
this, let us examine the examples he gives for his claim that the foundation holds 
either mutually or one-sidedly. On the one hand, color and extension, which I find 
in, say, a color patch I intuit or see, are mutually founded parts of the patch 
because neither of them can exist without the other. On the other hand, 
judgement about something is one-sidedly founded by a presentation of the 
same thing because an act of judging about A cannot exist without an act of 
presenting A but not vice versa. We can find these examples in Brentano’s lectures 
on descriptive psychology. The first example is regarded as that of mutually 
pervading parts, the second as that of one-sidedly (really) separable parts (see 
Section 2). Since mutually pervading parts are regarded as (really) inseparable 
from each other, how can we say, as Husserl does in the above passage, that his 
distinction agrees with Brentano’s one between mutually and one-sidedly 
separable parts? To be charitable with him, we should take Husserl as making a 
slip and read the first appearance of “ separability [Ablösbarkeit] ”  as 
“inseparability [Unablösbarkeit]”.18  
In comparison with Brentano’s, Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes 
exhibits two striking features.  
First, Husserl’s theory deals with formal relations among parts and wholes, 
which are not confined to a specific domain of objects but applicable to objects 
in general (Gegenstände überhaupt) (cf. Hua XIX/1, 227 [tr. vol. 2, 3]). Parts of 
consciousness, which is given a privileged position in Brentano’s discussions in his 
lectures on descriptive psychology, are here thought to be on the same footing 
as parts of any other entity. This is confirmed by the above passage too. There 
Husserl equally discusses the color and extension on the one hand and 
presentation and judgment on the other. 
Second, Husserl’s theory is unambiguously ontological.19 This is due to, 
                                              
For detailed treatments of this issue, see Correia (2004), Fine (1995), and Simons (1982). 
18 I have benefitted from a personal discussion with Andrea Altobrando on Husserl’s passage in 
question. 
19 We do not mean to say that Brentano’s theory of parts and wholes is not ontological. As 
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among other things, the fact that it explains Brentano’s notion of (real) 
inseparability in terms of foundation. Unlike Husserl, Brentano leaves almost 
unexplained his notions of separability and inseparably of parts, giving only 
examples that illustrate those notions. Perhaps he conceives them as primitive. 
Because of this, when he says that, for instance, noticing is inseparable from 
seeing, his expression does not completely exclude the (in our opinion, definitely 
wrong) interpretation that the inseparability stems from a certain limit of our 
capacity for separation. Likewise, when he says that we cannot attend to 
something without seeing it, one may understand him (mistakenly, in our opinion) 
as taking about a certain psychological inability for us. Husserl eliminates such 
ambiguities. In his framework, the inseparability of a part is nothing other than 
the existential dependence of the part. 
 Because of those two features, Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes 
disagrees with Brentano’s in an important respect. As should be clear from its first 
feature, it does not accept sui generis parts that are found only in the domain of 
the mental. In analyzing intentional reference, therefore, he could not appeal to 
the notion of part of intentional correlation-pair unless he generalizes it so that it 
is applicable to other domains of objects. Such a generalization, however, is 
impossible for him because of the second feature of his theory. As Brentano 
claims, parts of intentional correlation-pair are mutually (really) inseparable from 
each other. In Husserl’s framework, they would be parts that are existentially 
dependent on each other. Defined in this way, the notion of parts of intentional 
correlation-pair would be useless for Husserl. As we will see soon, he indeed holds 
that an act may be intentionally referred to a non-existent object such as the god 
Jupiter (see the next quote below). 
 Such a disagreement with Brentano is reflected in Husserl’s descriptive 
analysis of intentional reference in §11 of the Fifth Investigation. 
 
If I present [vorstellen] the god Jupiter, this god is a presented object, he 
is “immanently present” in my act, he has “mental inexistence” in 
the latter, or whatever expression we may use to disguise our true 
meaning. I present the god Jupiter: this means that I have a certain 
                                              
Mulligan & Smith (1985, 627) observes, Brentano’s approach to mind is distinctive in its being 
ontological. Our point is only that he leaves certain ambiguities in the terminology for his 
ontology of mind. 
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presentation-experience, the presenting-the-god-Jupiter is realized in me 
(my consciousness). This intentional experience may be dismembered as 
one wants in descriptive analysis, but the god Jupiter naturally will not be 
found in it. The “immanent”, “mental object” is not therefore a part 
of the descriptive make-up of the experience, it is in truth not immanent 
or mental. But it also does not exist at all. This does not prevent that 
presenting-the-god-Jupiter from existing [sein] […]. (Hua XIX/1, 386–387 
[tr. vol. 2, 99], translation modified, our emphases) 
 
Here Husserl holds what Kriegel (2018, 57–58) calls hyphenism. The act of 
presenting the god Jupiter, he holds, has several parts that we can dismember 
(zergliedern) or articulate by means of descriptive analysis. One such part is 
“presenting-the-god-Jupiter [Den-Gott-Jupiter-Vorstellen].” As he indicates by 
the hyphens, however, he does not allow us to follow Brentano and to articulate 
this part into presenting and the god Jupiter. Refusing to adopt the notion of 
parts of intentional correlation-pair, Husserl decidedly breaks with the immanent 
theory, which, according to a certain interpretation, his teacher maintains. 
 For our interpretation, which we have just outlined, there remain two 
problems.  
First, in the Third Investigation, Husserl defines part as anything that we 
can distinguish within something (cf. Hua XIX/1, 231 [tr. vol. 2, 5]). Now, there 
certainly is a sense in which presenting and the god Jupiter can be distinguished 
within the act in question. To accommodate this solid intuition, however, wouldn’t 
Husserl have to admit smaller parts which correspond to the distinction and which 
make up the presenting-the-god-Jupiter? 
Second, in the above passage, Husserl thinks himself as articulating the 
act of presenting the god Jupiter by singling out the presenting-the-god-Jupiter. 
In what sense, however, is this an articulation of the whole into smaller parts? In 
other words, what else remains in the act in question apart from the presenting-
the-god-Jupiter?  
 To deal with these problems, we must introduce Husserl’s distinction 
between qualities and matter of act in the Fifth Investigation. 
 
This is the distinction between the general act-character, which stamps an 
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act as merely presentative, judgmental, emotional, desiderative etc., and 
its “content” which stamps it as presenting this thing that is presented, 
as judging that thing that is judged about etc. etc. The two assertions 
“ 2*2=4 ”  and “ Ibsen is the principal founder of modern dramatic 
realism” are both, qua assertions, of one kind: each is qualified as an 
assertion and their common feature is their judgement-quality. The one, 
however, judges on content and the other another content. To distinguish 
such “contents” from other notions of “content” we shall speak here 
of the judgement-matter. We draw similar distinctions between quality 
and matter in the case of all acts. (Hua XIX/1, 425–426 [tr. vol. 2, 119], 
quoted from the second edition,20 translation modified) 
 
As he observes here, every intentional act has two different aspects.21 One has 
to do with the mode in which the act refers to a certain object, the other with 
what the act refers to in a certain mode. It is those aspects that Husserl calls 
(act-)quality and (act-)matter, respectively. What matters for our present purpose 
is that he counts them as part of consciousness: “ In each act’s descriptive 
content we have distinguished quality and matter as two mutually dependent 
moments [zwei einander wechselseitig fordernde Momente]” (Hua XIX/1, 431 [tr. 
vol. 2, 122], translation modified). 
 Now, let us see how Husserl gives a solution to the first problem. 
Introducing the quality/matter distinction, he admits that the presenting-the-
god-Jupiter has a further part-whole structure. It consists of a matter by virtue of 
which it is a presenting-the-god-Jupiter on the one hand and an act-quality by 
virtue of which it is a presenting-the-god-Jupiter. The important point is that the 
                                              
20 Here we do not follow the first edition because Husserl expresses his idea more lucidly in the 
second edition, without modifying its content. 
21 Note that this idea, which admits the quality/matter distinction in acts of presenting, is also 
part of Husserl's break with Brentano. The latter holds that, in the formers' terminology, acts of 
presenting does not have an act-quality. For this point, see Akiba 2008.   
 22 
matter of the act is different from the god Jupiter. While the former is real just as 
the act of which it is part is, the same does not hold of the latter, which does not 
exist in the first place. That is why Husserl deals with qualities and matters as 
dependent parts, where dependence is defined as existential.  
 The same distinction also helps us to clarify Husserl’s solution to the 
second problem. While the quality and matter make up the presenting-the-god-
Jupiter, they do not exhaust the structure of the act of presenting the god Jupiter 
as a whole. As Husserl claims in §25 of the Sixth Investigation, every objectifying 
act (i.e., act with its own act matter) has as its components not only a quality and 
a matter but also a representative content [repräsentirender Inhalt], which 
determines the extent to which the act is intuitive (cf. XIX/2, 620–621 [tr. vol. 2, 
242]; see also XIX/1, 433 [tr. vol. 2, 123–124]).22  
For the solution to the second problem, there remains a further problem. 
It might be of interest to those who care about details, but one may ignore it 
without any substantial loss for the mainline of our discussion. What is the precise 
relationship between the three parts of an act? There are two possibilities which, 
to continue with our example, could be indicated as follow. First, the three parts 
might be on the same layer: 
 
 The act of presenting the god Jupiter has three dependent parts: 
  a quality 
  a matter  
  a representative content 
 
In this case, the quality, matter, and representative content would be dependent 
on each other in the same way. Second, they might have a certain hierarchy: 
 
 The act of presenting the god Jupiter has two dependent parts: 
  a representative content 
  a presenting-the-god-Jupiter, which has two dependent parts: 
   a quality 
   a matter 
 
                                              
22 For a fuller account of the threefold structure of acts Husserl here conceives, see Klev 2013. 
For Husserl’s distinction between objectifying and non-objectifying acts, see Melle 2019, Mayer & 
Erhard 2019. 
which make up a presenting-the-god-Jupiter 
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Here, the quality and matter would be located in a deeper layer than the 
representative content. Correspondingly, dependence among the three parts 
would be multiplied. On the one hand, the representing content and the 
presenting-the-god-Jupiter are mutually dependent. Within the latter, on the 
other hand, the quality and matter are mutually dependent. In this case too, 
however, it would be implied that the three parts are mutually dependent on each 
other. Which is, then, correct? Very likely, Husserl subscribes to the second potion. 
Since not every matter makes a pair with any quality,23 the dependency between 
them must require some special considerations, in which their relation to the 
representative content can be ignored. This would suggest that Husserl admits 
the two-layered part-whole structure in the act 
 There is yet another problem which we have to answer in order to 
understand Husserl’s position better. In the passage we have quoted from §11 of 
the Fifth Investigation, Husserl may seem to ground his rejection of the immanent 
theory on his theory of parts and wholes. Such an interpretation, however, would 
render Husserl’s discussion into a problematic argument against the immanent 
theory op intentionality. On this reading, Husserl would hold that the immanent 
theory is wrong because we could not attain an immanent object in whatever way 
we articulate the part-whole structure of an act. In other words, he would reject 
this theory because there is no formal (i.e., non-domain-specific) notion that 
corresponds to Brentano’s parts of intentional correlation-pair. To such a line of 
argument, one can object: Why should we favor Husserl’s position and reject 
Brentano’s idea that intentional reference is a domain-specific relation that is 
found only in the mental? If this question is left untouched, the reconstructed 
argument would remain incomplete. As far as we could see, it seems difficult, if 
not impossible, to find an answer to the question from Logical Investigations. 
 We can solve this problem by adopting an alternative reading of the 
passage from §11 of the Fifth Investigation. According to this reading, his theory 
of part and whole has only to do with his positive view on the intentional 
reference which he presents elsewhere: The intentional reference of an act is 
determined by the matter of that act.24 It is thanks to such a determination that 
                                              
23 For example, we cannot have an act of judgment with the content (i.e., matter) that everything 
is not identical with itself, because any self-contradictory content cannot be a part of judging as 
holding-something-as-true (Fürwahrhalten). 
24  In his own words: “All difference in the way of objective [i.e., intentional] reference are 
descriptive differences in the relevant intentional experiences” (Hua XIX/1, 427 [tr. vol. 2, 120], 
translation modified).  
 24 
he can descriptively analyze the intentional reference into parts—the relevant 
matter and quality—without admitting the immanent object as a part of the act.25 
If we take into consideration this idea of Husserl, the passage from §11 could be 
understood as a demonstration of how the act of presenting the god Jupiter 
would be analyzed descriptively.26  
 
Conclusion   
As we have shown, for both Brentano and the early Husserl, the 
descriptive analysis is confined to the part-whole structure of consciousness, from 
which anything that transcends consciousness is excluded. If we are to adopt this 
method, we would have to consider objects of consciousness either as immanent 
to consciousness (Brentano) or as having nothing to do with the descriptive 
analysis (the early Husserl). This must not be a good result for many people who 
take the Husserlian phenomenology as dealing with our openness to the world.27 
So, one might be tempted to ask, should our closing words be solely negative? 
Have we shown a limit or even a defect of the conception of phenomenology or 
descriptive psychology which the early Husserl inherits from Brentano? Such a 
question would be more pressing given that Husserl later attempts to expand the 
domain of descriptive analysis to objects that transcend consciousness. 28 
Perhaps we should accept such a conclusion to some extent.  
There is, however, some positive outcome of our discussion too. At least 
according to a certain interpretation, Husserl keeps on applying his theory of 
parts and wholes to his analysis of consciousness even after Logical Investigations. 
                                              
25  Thus, shortly before the passage quoted in the previous footnote, he claims: “For the 
phenomenological consideration, objectivity counts as nothing: in general, it transcends the act. 
No matter what sense and with what right we talk about the ‘being’ of the object, and no matter 
whether this being is real or ideal, whether it is truly existent or possible or impossible, the act 
remains ‘directed upon’ its object” (Hua XIX/1, 427 [tr. vol. 2, 120], translation modified). 
26 Our interpretation does not make Husserl's rejection of the immanent theory groundless. 
Husserl gives several arguments against the immanent theory of intentionality elsewhere in the 
Fifth Investigation. In the appendix to §§11&20, he attempts to show that the immanent theory 
leads to absurdities (cf. Hua XIX/1, 436–440 [tr. vol. 2, 125–127]). For a general discussion of 
Husserl’s arguments against the immanent theory, see Naberhaus (2014). 
27 For a classic and impressive example of such an idea, see Sartre (1970). 
28 In the second edition of Logical Investigations, Husserl adds the following note to the passage 
from §16 of the Fifth Investigation we quoted in Section 1. "It became plainer and plainer, however, 
as I reviewed the completed Investigations and pondered on their themes more deeply—
particularly from this point onwards—that the description of intentional objectivity as such, as we 
are conscious of it in the concrete act-experience, represents a distinct descriptive dimension 
where purely intuitive description may be adequately practised [...]" (Hua XIX/1, 411 [tr. vol 2, 354]).  
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As Drummond observes: “ One way to understand the [phenomenological] 
reduction is that it is a particular kind of reflective move that changes the whole 
upon which we reflect when doing philosophy”  (Drummond 2008; see also 
Sokolowski 1968). Instead of opposing consciousness as a whole to the world, 
Husserl, on this interpretation, now takes consciousness and the world making up 
a whole. If this is correct, Husserl, after Logical Investigations, would come to 
agree with his teacher in that intentional correlation-pair—noesis and noema, to 
put it in his own terminology—are parts of a whole. At this moment, such an 
interpretation still remains a hypothesis. Examinations of this idea, we hope, will 
shed new light not only on the relationship between the two philosophers but 
also on the nature of intentionality.29 
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